The paper first deals with the choice of routes to be examined and, after a preliminary statistical description of these, applies the ARIMA models. These results are examined for both their statistical qualities and their reasonableness and the impacts are compared to those previously determined in the same way for Ryanair's routes from London.
Introduction
Previous published work (Pitfield, 2007a) has been able to demonstrate, using
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) modelling with Intervention
Analysis, what the impact of Ryanair's start up of service from London Stansted (STN) has been on competing airlines flying from other airports in the London system to either the same airport as Ryanair but more usually to an airport that is not thought of as a secondary airport. The impact is considerable. Passenger numbers grow on the route as a result of the start up and Ryanair at least captures that growth and normally has an impact on existing carriers by taking some of their share of the market as well.
Ryanair based its business model on one first developed by Southwest, originally based in Texas but now the sixth biggest airline in the USA (Calder, 2002) and the only US airline to have been profitable every year since its inception. The impact of Southwest on prices (Morrison, 2001 ) and its competitors is so well known it has long been referred to as 'the Southwest Effect' (USDOT, 1993; Richards, 1996) with evidence being seen at Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) Airport (Phillips, 1996) and again at Denver (DEN).
1 Boguslaski, Ito and Lee, (2004) investigate the entry patterns of Southwest and indicate airlines that might be vulnerable to such competition and McMullen and Du (2007) have investigated the impact of the ATASouthwest code share.
However, there have not been any recent estimates on the impact on traffic. Estimates exist in the past papers of Windle et al (1995) , Dresner et al (1996) and Vowles (2001) . The first mentioned paper looked at data from 1991 to 1994 and found that the 1 Airport Business (2006) entry of Southwest onto a route resulted in an average price decline of 48 percent and a traffic increase of 200 percent on the Southwest routes whereas the second paper, which in part focuses on Southwest's start up at BWI in 1993, develops a general econometric model so as to comment principally on pricing behaviour. The third paper undertakes a series of airport case studies including one for BWI.
A current estimate of the intervention effect on passenger numbers of Southwest, its competitors or on total traffic on the routes will enable comparisons with past estimates and with the Ryanair impact previously determined. In addition, it will allow impacts to be determined for a much more mature market situation when the most recent start ups are examined.
USBTS Form 100 data is available online on a monthly basis from 1990 (BTS, 2006).
This details origin-destination passengers carried between airports by airline and ARIMA models can be applied to this data before the start up of Southwest on routes when its impact can be estimated.
Data
The difficulty with this proposed approach, given the longevity of Southwest and its presence on many routes before 1990, is that the routes that can be examined are limited. Clearly, the start of Southwest service has to be after 1990 so that a time series model can be built before it intervenes. In addition, there is some credibility in the notion that 'important' routes should be looked at. In terms of passenger volume this can be based on the size of airports and Table 1 lists the ten busiest US airports.
But this does not help much in terms of determining which city pair flows are 'important' or which could demonstrate the size of impact of Southwest on principal domestic traffic flows. An approach is taken here which first examines FAA data to identify city pairs in the 48 contiguous states that have a large number of flights between them as a guide to which city pairs should be examined in the BTS data to determine total passenger flows on corridors (see Table 2 ). 
ARIMA Modelling
The formal method of ARIMA modelling and Intervention Analysis can be found in a variety of textbooks including Wei (1994) and McDowell et al (1980) and the published appendix to Pitfield (2007a) contains both an outline of this and of the assessment of goodness-of-fit. 5 The impact of the ATA Southwest code share can again be investigated 6 Otherwise it would be especially interesting to examine the impact on the traffic between the Bay Area (San Francisco, SFO and Oakland, OAK) to LAX first noted by USDOT (1993) .
The purpose of ARIMA models is to duplicate as closely as possible the typical variations in a time series. Their adequacy is checked by examining both goodness-offit statistics and whether the residuals are white noise. If they are adequate, then the model will have captured all the indigenous factors that underlie the variation in the series being modelled. If such a model is calibrated on the traffic data before the commencement of Southwest service, then the same model form, plus an intervention variable, can be applied to the whole data series to establish the impact on the total series of the start up. This can then be compared to the size of actual market shares and inferences drawn on the impact of competition.
As the data series are monthly observations from 1990, it is clear that there will be both seasonal and non-seasonal components in the model. In essence, the series is The intervention variable can take a variety of forms but intuitively it is easy to justify an abrupt step function because of the apparent impact of Southwest start ups on traffic volumes on routes 7 . In addition, if this start up coincides with other important exogenous influences, they would also have to be specifically examined and isolated.
Although this conventional reason cannot be invoked for the routes studied here, it is interesting to examine the abrupt intervention impact on domestic propensity to fly of 9/11 and this is done. Table 3 gives the results shown in Table 4 . A less parsimonious model with an additional seasonal autoregressive parameter also did well but there is some doubt about the order of such a model (see McDowall et al, 1980) .
Results

Washington-Chicago
The intervention variables show that Southwest expanded the traffic on the route by 19 percent, somewhat higher than its current annual market share but quite consistent with its initial impact 9 . The implication is that Southwest brought additional passengers to the route attracted by its low fares but that it had little impact on the traffic carried by competing carriers. Indeed, it may have lost some of its initial traffic to other airlines as they responded to the competition.
The 9/11 impact suggests a decline of over 50 percent. This impact is large but may be consistent with the findings of Blunk, Clark and McGibany (2006) on revenue passenger miles who argue that the impact of 9/11 is longer term and more permanent than industry analysts had first supposed. These revenue passenger mile figures would now be higher if you pose the counter-factual that 9/11 did not happen. The estimated impact also appears to be consistent with estimated impacts on some north Atlantic traffic (see Pitfield, 2007b) .
The code share agreement in February 2005 with ATA produced no significant coefficients. Although the start of the IAD service is very recent it was also examined as was Independence Air. Neither had significant impacts with t values between 1 and 2 but their coefficients were positive and respectively 10 and 6 percent; the Southwest impact at BWI was not materially affected by the inclusion of these variables indicating robustness in the results. There is little to choose here between a (1,1,0) (2,1,0)12 ARIMA model and a
Philadelphia-Chicago
(1,1,0) (3,1,0)12 alternative except for the parsimony of the former. On that basis although 9/11 is seen to have a large significant impact (-0.60), the start up of Southwest is not significant with a parameter estimated at 0.40 and t=0.63.
Alternative specifications of the model appear to indicate quite robust estimates of the parameters. Neither intervention estimates or their significance changes very much.
The results are shown in Table 6 11 .
The results are surprising, but perhaps predictable. If the four months at the end of 2000 are compared to the four at the end of 2001, a near 20 percent traffic decline is observed. On that basis the 60 percent value for 9/11 may be an overestimate although 10 Monthly data is plotted in Figure 2 and the start of service date indicated. 11 A gradual intervention effect over 12 months did not improve the results.
as noted above, there is some work that suggests it should be less but not considerably so. The Southwest effect may be surprising, however, this is not a leisure route primarily and one of the airports used is secondary; both factors weighing against a larger impact. The raw data shows an immediate but short-lived upturn after May 2004 and it may be for this reason that the impact is not significant 12 .
Monthly traffic for the main airlines on the route is shown in Table 7 from May 2004 to try and aid understanding. The total grows for the first three months, but in August, the traffic of United, US Airways and Southwest all fell. In September they were joined by American and ATA, with most making some recovery in October.
There is no large change in airline supply that explains these fluctuations either absolutely or relatively. Demand on this route generally fell in some months after May, so Southwest's impact on size, despite its growing share, does not register as significant. Despite the lack of significance of a market size effect, it is clear that Southwest itself thrived with a nearly 22 percent share of the market in 2006 13 . In other words, it did not expand the market size but it did take traffic from competitors.
Boston-Chicago
Looking at the annual traffic data in Table 8 shows the initially dominant position of United and American between these city pairs. Even after Southwest starts service between MDW and PVD in October 1996, it only captures 6.02 percent of the market in the first year of operation, although this of course represents a higher percentage of 12 Again the ATA code share is not significant. 13 There is a suggestion that Southwest might be competing with itself at Boston and Baltimore, but these alternatives offered service earlier, so it should be their traffic that is diluted on the start of the PHL service. In addition, at around 100 miles away it could be argued that they are too far distant. This seems a very interesting route to study using ARIMA methods as both Southwest start ups can be examined for a significant intervention effect, along with 9/11 and the code sharing agreement. Figure 3 shows the time series plot. Not only are the start of service dates to PVD and MHT shown respectively, but so is the start of the ATA code sharing agreement.
Following the usual procedures, an autoregressive model of the usual form is fitted and this gives the results shown in Table 9 . Neither the start up at PVD nor the later one at MHT are statistically significant as abrupt impacts but they do have the right signs and show an impact of 5.7 and 4.8 percent respectively 14 . The 9/11 impact is significant with a coefficient of -0.43. The ATA code share is omitted from the Table   as it is insignificant. 14 Varying model forms produces quite robust similar estimates and a gradual intervention again fails to produce significant results but suggests bigger impacts of 14 and 19 percent for PVD and MHT respectively.
These results, like those for Philadelphia -Chicago, imply that although the impact of Southwest on market size is insignificant, the fact that they have over 17 percent of the market in 2006 shows that they had an impact on the shares of their competitors, in this case, American, judging from Table 8 . Table 10 shows the annual shares on the corridor with the early dominance of United and American. This position is maintained in the 21 st century, but the relative position of these two airlines is weakened as can be seen from their falling shares. The figures for Southwest show a gradual impact on market share, followed by a boost in 2005 which may be the result of the ATA code share. This intervention can be tested along with the Southwest start up and 9/11. Figure 4 shows the monthly traffic data where some of the impacts discussed seem to be plain and others more obscure.
Bay Area-Chicago
The usual procedures again yield a (1,1,0) (2,1,0) 12 model and the results are shown in Table 11 although there is a question mark over the character of the residuals with a spike at lag 36. Less parsimonious models can push this spike to greater lags but are questionable as model improvements. All show, however, the 9/11 intervention to be significant and sizable with the Southwest start up and the advent of code share insignificant. Specifying the Southwest intervention as a gradual one does not improve the result. As with the previous case, the implication, given their market share in 2006 of over 18 percent, is that this traffic largely came from their competitors.
Denver-Las Vegas
Traffic is dominated by United Airlines throughout this period from 1990. Southwest starts service in January 2006 and it can be seen from Table 12 The 9/11 parameter shows that traffic was negatively impacted by 41.8 percent. This degree of impact is consistent with the simple observation of the series and may well be in accordance with previous findings.
Conclusions
Similar ARIMA models are developed for each of the chosen corridors. The results
show the significant impact of 9/11 in all cases and the significant impact on size of Southwest's start up in two of the five cases at around 20 percent. How do these impacts compare to those found in other empirical work? Are these results in accordance with past work? Table 14 illustrates the paradigm of interpretations of effects giving the datum of market share and the estimated impact on size. It shows that Southwest is in the last two rows of the Table either taking traffic entirely from competitors, as its entry does not grow the market, or growing the market and keeping that traffic. Ryanair is in the first category where it grows the market and takes share from competitors. It has significant and often larger impacts from market entry.
The impact of Southwest is less than that found for the majority of routes examined in Pitfield (2007a) for Ryanair. Exceptions are Stockholm and Hamburg's start up impacts. These are lower and of the order of 10 percent and these might be argued to be comparable to the Southwest routes in terms of scale and market segment but the impacts on Venice, Pisa and Genoa were estimated at 26, 30 and 44 percent respectively. What reasons can be used to explain this difference?
First of all, the Italian destinations analysed are more likely to be dominated by leisure traffic than the US cases, with the exception of Las Vegas. However the Las Vegas service has only been in place for just over a year so it may be too early to assess the true long term impact of Southwest.
Second, the number of carriers on the routes is higher in the US cases than the European and the scale of traffic is considerably higher on all corridors except London -Stockholm.
Third, Ryanair, with its frequent offerings of flights at £0.01, as they still appear on the website excluding taxes and charges, may be a more aggressive competitor.
However an examination of fares being offered on two routes with similar stage length, four months from the time of writing (August 3 rd 2007) shows that the Ryanair return fare with all taxes and charges was £118 or $217 whereas the Southwest promotional fare was $246 or £134. In this case Ryanair is only fractionally cheaper so its 'normal' fares don't indicate any competitive edge but its reputation and its noninclusive fares may.
For all these reasons, it might be concluded that Southwest, when it has significant effects, has a smaller initial impact than Ryanair but that Ryanair establishes larger market shares as a result of its impact on competitors. It appears that the major US competitors are more competitive than most of Ryanair's competitors in maintaining share through pricing and product differentiation.
Finally, the explanation for the different estimates might be based on the different levels of network maturity and familiarity with low-cost service and this topic could be approached empirically using Gini coefficients (Huber, 2005) . This might be why the Ryanair impacts are higher than the Southwest impacts established using the same time series methodology.
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